Glasgow, Rupert
Congratulations on passing the viva voce on 4 October 2016.
Dissertation topic: "Die Naturgeschichte des Selbst"/"The Phylogeny of the Self."
Contact address at the University of Würzburg:
Institute of German Philology / Modern German Literary History
Chair of Modern German Literary History
Am Hubland
D-97074 Würzburg
First supervisor: Prof. Dr Roland Borgards
Second supervisor:
Prof Dr Martin Heisenberg (retired)
Class in the Graduate School: "Philosophy, Languages, Arts"
Doctorate in the Graduate School from WS 2014/2015.
Abstract:
The aim of the thesis is to provide a conceptual analysis of the 'self'. Starting from a concept of self as intrinsic or immanent reflexivity, the aim is to identify and examine different levels of self-organisation and self-preservation, the distinction between self and non-self, self-consciousness and self-determination.
The analysis ranges from 'selfish' genes and DNA to cells as a kind of primordial self, multicellular organisms and the human self, as well as the possible selfhood of superorganisms. Firstly, an attempt is made to develop the idea of a minimal self (e.g. a paramecium or a chameleon); secondly, the relationship between selfhood and its possible embodiment in a brain or nervous system is investigated; thirdly, the relationship between a single, individual self and a super- or meta-self in the form of a multicellular organism or superorganism is analysed.
The fundamental question is: at what point in natural history, and in what sense, is it possible to ascribe a self to an entity? What does this implicitly and explicitly say about the entity in question? Can we define the minimum conditions that must be met in order to be able to meaningfully describe a self as such?
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My work focuses on the concept of a 'self', unpacking some of the implications of selfhood defined in terms of intrinsic reflexivity. This involves looking at different levels of self-organisation and self-maintenance, self/non-self discrimination, self-awareness and self-determination.
Such an analysis ranges from the genetic level via the cellular level through to the level of individual metazoans, human self-awareness and super-organisms. The focus will be firstly on the idea of a minimal self (as applied, for example, to single-celled organisms), secondly on the relationship between the self and its embodiment in a brain or nervous system, and thirdly on the relationship between a single, individual self and meta-selves in the form of multicellular organisms and super-organisms.
The underlying question is: from what point in the phylogenetic 'scale', and in what sense, can we ascribe a self to an entity? What are the implications of any such ascription? Can we establish the minimum conditions that must be fulfilled for a self to be validly ascribed to an organism? At the same time, sight is not lost of the attendant risks both of anthropomorphism in applying the term 'self' to non-human life forms and of anthropocentrism in conceiving of a 'scale' of selfhood with humans as its pinnacle.
