Idika, Christiana Ngozi
Congratulations on passing the viva voce examination
on 31 May 2016.
Topic of the dissertation:
"The Principles of Liberty, Equality, Love, Respect and Solidarity in Rawls and Honneth - Towards an Internomative Hermeneutics for Social Justice."
Contact address at the University of Würzburg:
Chair of Christian Social Science
Paradeplatz 4
97070 Würzburg
First supervisor: Prof. Dr Dr Gerhard Droesser
Second supervisors:
Prof. Dr Wolfgang Klausnitzer (retired)
Class in the Graduate School: "Philosophy, Languages, Arts"
Doctorate in the Graduate School since SS 2011.
Abstract:
English:
What principle can account for an ethical conception of a well-ordered and just society? John Rawls writes that a well-ordered society is a society guided by the principle of justice. Rawls assumes that for a society to be conceived as at least relatively just, that it is necessary that its basic social and political institutions distribute the primary goods, rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth according to valid principles of justice which are reasonably agreed among citizens in original position under the veil of ignorance through a process of overlapping consensus of different religious, moral and philosophical beliefs depending on reflective equilibrium. For Honneth, a well-ordered society is conceived as a society guided by a plural conception of justice explicated under a theory of recognition. He claims that the question of justice is no longer concerned with inequality but elimination of humiliation and disrespect. He argues that this recognition bears a labyrinth of love, right and solidarity.
It is argued that both authors "share the basic intention of securing for all its citizen the material and institutional condition for the actualization of otherwise merely formal liberties or in Honneth's terms, mutual self realization." However Rawls' argument for the priority of liberty over equality and solidarity on one hand and the normative justification of the claims of recognition in the light it's polyvalent meaning on the other hand, seems to create plural norms that generate different sources of obligation.
Therefore, how can philosophy, in view of the plurality of norms in contemporary global social changes, deliver adequate approach towards conflicting and incommensurable ethical values for a conception of social justice for a well-ordered society? Is an integrated interpretation of ethical standards possible without reductionism, assimilation and prioritisation? What role can interculturality and interculturally-oriented hermeneutics play in the treatment of inter-relations of liberty, love, equality, respect and solidarity to yield an inter-normative principle of social justice?
Liberty, love, equality, respect and solidarity appear decisively in almost all the cultures, religions and even in different disciplines and bear significant normative consequences. However, their structural relation presents them as paralell, conflictual, incommensurable, or even hierarchical. The values are necessary in understanding justice that defends both individuals' good and common good. But it requires an approach that interprets them as structurally related to each other. The study claims that when norms are plural and creates relational problems, they should be interpreted in a way that avoids reduction, assimilation, or prioritisation.
------------------------------------------------------
German:
The Principle of Justice and Recognition by Rawls and Honneth - Towards an Internormative Hermeneutics for Social Justice
Which principle can be used as a justification for an ethical conception or interpretation of a well-ordered and just society? John Rawls writes that a well-ordered and just society is one that is structured and governed according to the principle of justice. Rawls assumes that for a society to be or become considered at least relatively just, it is necessary that its basic social and political institutions be able to distribute primary goods, rights and freedoms, opportunities and powers, income and wealth according to valid principles of justice.
In contrast to Rawls, Honneth believes that a just society is one that is conceptualised by a plural conception of justice under a theory of recognition. He argues that recognition carries a labyrinth structure of love, justice and solidarity.
It is argued that the two authors share the basic intention of securing for all its (society's) citizens the material and institutional condition for the realisation of otherwise merely formal freedoms or, in Honneth's view, mutual self-realisation. However, Rawls' argument for the primacy of freedom over equality and solidarity on the one hand, and that of the normative justification of the claims to recognition in terms of its multivalent meaning on the other, seems to create multiple norms that generate different sources of obligation, on the face of it.
Therefore, it could be asked: how philosophy, given the multiplicity of norms and contemporary global societal changes, can provide a sufficient approach to conflicting and immeasurable ethical values for a conception of social justice for a well-ordered society? Is an integrated interpretation of ethical standards possible without reductionism, assimilation and prioritisation? What role can interculturality and an interculturally orientated hermeneutics play in addressing the interrelations between freedom, love, equality, respect and solidarity in order to generate an inter-normative principle of social justice?
Freedom, love, equality, respect and solidarity occur pertinently in almost all cultures, religions and even in different disciplines and carry clear normative consequences. However, their structural relationship turns out to be conflictual, incommensurable or even hierarchical. The values are necessary for an understanding or comprehension of justice that defends both the well-being of individuals and society. But it requires an approach that interprets them as structurally interconnected. The study or work seeks to argue that if these five norms are necessary for the justification of social justice are also plural, and moreover create relational problems, they should then be interpreted in a way that avoids reduction, assimilation, or prioritisation.
